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Outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) refers to the finding that presenting 
Pavlovian predictors of outcomes can enhance the vigour of instrumental responding for those same 
outcomes. Three experiments examined the sensitivity of outcome-selective PIT to Pavlovian 
(stimulus-outcome) extinction. In Experiment 1, participants first learned to perform different 
instrumental responses to earn different outcomes. In a separate Pavlovian training phase, certain 
stimuli were established as Pavlovian signals of the different outcomes. Some of these Pavlovian 
stimuli were then extinguished (they were presented alone, without any outcome), while others 
were not. A final transfer test measured the extent to which these Pavlovian cues biased 
instrumental response choice. Consistent with previous work, the observed PIT effects were immune 
to Pavlovian extinction; the non-extinguished and extinguished cues produced PIT effects that did 
not significantly differ in size. In Experiment 2, response choice was tested in the presence of 
compound stimuli that included both extinguished and non-extinguished cues. Response choice was 
highly sensitive to the extinction manipulation under these circumstances. Experiment 3 tested 
whether this sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction was a direct effect of the associative strength of the 
Pavlovian cues present, or an indirect effect of cue salience. The results provide unique evidence to 
suggest that PIT is a direct consequence of the strength of the Pavlovian associations. 
Keywords: Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, extinction, cue reactivity.  
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Cues that signal rewarding outcomes can motivate reward-seeking behaviours (e.g., 
Hogarth, Dickinson, & Duka, 2010). Such cue reactivity is often adaptive, allowing individuals to 
selectively seek natural rewards (such as food and drink) that are predictable in a given 
environment. Cue reactivity can also become problematic, however, as seen in the case of drug 
addiction (Hogarth et al., 2010) and overeating (Ridley-Siegert, Crombag, & Yeomans, 2015; Watson, 
Wiers, Hommel, Ridderinkhof, & de Wit, 2016).  
Cue reactivity is often assessed experimentally using Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) 
tasks (e.g., Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki, & Duka, 2007; Kruse, 
Overmier, Konz, & Rokke, 1983). Outcome-selective PIT tasks, for example, typically involve separate 
instrumental and Pavlovian training phases (the order of which varies), followed by a final transfer 
test. During instrumental training, participants learn that two instrumental responses (R1 and R2) 
earn two rewarding outcomes (O1 and O2), such that R1 earns outcome O1 and R2 earns outcome 
O2 (R1 – O1, R2 – O2). During Pavlovian training, two neutral stimuli (S1 and S2) are consistently 
paired with outcomes O1 and outcome O2, respectively, to establish S1-O1 and S2-O2 associations. 
In a final transfer test, the Pavlovian stimuli S1 and S2 are presented on separate trials and 
instrumental response choice (R1 vs R2) is tested. The critical finding is that the cues typically 
increase the instrumental response that was paired with the same outcome as the cue. That is, 
stimulus S1 selectively increases R1 responses (both paired with O1), and stimulus S2 increases R2 
responses (both paired with O2). Importantly, the transfer test is usually conducted in extinction 
(i.e., no outcomes are provided during this test) to ensure that response choice is not driven by new 
learning about the stimulus-response relationships during the test. Thus, the PIT effects observed 
are usually thought to reflect an interaction between the Pavlovian (S-O) and instrumental (R-O) 
associations that formed during the preceding training phases (although see Cohen-Hatton, Haddon, 
George, and Honey, 2013, for a different interpretation).  
A peculiar aspect of outcome-selective PIT effects is that they are often robust against a 
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range of manipulations that one might expect to diminish them. In particular, outcome-selective PIT 
effects have been reported to be insensitive to both outcome devaluation (Corbit, Janak, & Balleine, 
2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994; van Steenbergen, 
Watson, Wiers, Hommel, & de Wit, 2017; Watson, Wiers, Hommel, & de Wit, 2014, although for 
exceptions see Allman, DeLeon, Cataldo, Holland, & Johnson, 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 2016b; 
Seabrooke, Le Pelley, Hogarth, & Mitchell, 2017) and Pavlovian extinction manipulations (Delamater, 
1996; Hogarth et al., 2014; Rosas, Paredes-Olay, García-Gutiérrez, Espinosa, & Abad, 2010, but also 
see Delamater, Schneider, & Derman, 2017). Hogarth et al. (2014) provided a good example of this 
insensitivity to Pavlovian extinction. They trained participants to perform two instrumental 
responses (R1 and R2) to earn tobacco and chocolate points (outcomes O1 and O2), to establish R1-
O1 and R2-O2 associations. Four Pavlovian stimulus-outcome (S-O) associations were then 
established in a Pavlovian training phase. Two stimuli, S1 and S2, predicted outcome O1 (S1-O1, S2-
O1); the remaining stimuli predicted outcome O2 (S3-O2, S4-O2). Importantly, S2 and S4 stopped 
predicting the outcomes part way through the Pavlovian training phase, and instead predicted 
“nothing”. Hence, one stimulus that was associated with each outcome was extinguished. On test, 
each Pavlovian cue (S1-S4) was presented individually and instrumental response choice (R1 vs. R2) 
was tested. Unsurprisingly, the non-extinguished cues (S1 and S3) produced typical outcome-
selective PIT effects (S1 and S3 increased choice of R1 and R2, respectively). Crucially, the 
extinguished cues produced similar effects (S2 and S4 increased choice of R1 and R2, respectively), 
and the size of the PIT effects for the extinguished and non-extinguished stimuli did not significantly 
differ. Such findings (also observed in studies with rats; Delamater, 1996), have led to a prevailing 
view that appetitive, outcome-selective PIT effects are largely insensitive to Pavlovian extinction.  
The insensitivity to Pavlovian extinction described above is particularly intriguing from a 
theoretical perspective, because it arguably speaks against the most widely advocated model of PIT: 
S-O-R theory (e.g., Alarcón & Bonardi, 2016; Alarcón, Bonardi, & Delamater, 2017; de Wit & 
Dickinson, 2009; Watson et al., 2014, 2016). S-O-R theory assumes that Pavlovian conditioning 
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produces excitatory stimulus-outcome (S-O) links between the Pavlovian cues and the rewarding 
outcomes. Instrumental conditioning is also suggested to foster a link between the instrumental 
response R and the outcome O, either as a bidirectional R-O/O-R link (Asratyan, 1974; Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001; Pavlov, 1932), or an indirect outcome-response O-R link (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; 
Trapold & Overmier, 1972). In the transfer test, the Pavlovian stimulus is then suggested to activate 
the outcome representation (through the S-O link), which in turn activates and triggers the 
associated instrumental response through the instrumental O-R link. Thus, S-O-R theory suggests 
that Pavlovian cues increase instrumental responses via a chain of Pavlovian and instrumental links 
that are mediated by a common outcome.  
S-O-R theory assumes that PIT effects depend on the Pavlovian stimulus S activating the 
associated outcome O. It therefore predicts that, as long as Pavlovian extinction weakens the S-O 
association effectively, it should also reduce the ability of the Pavlovian stimulus S to elicit a PIT 
effect (Hogarth et al., 2014). Of course, S-O-R theory is non-committal about whether extinction 
should actually degrade S-O associations in the first place. If the extinction procedure fails to weaken 
the relevant underlying associations, then S-O-R theory would naturally predict a strong PIT effect 
despite the extinction procedure (Delamater, 1996). Delamater and Westbrook (2014), for example, 
suggested that extinction might weaken the association between the Pavlovian stimulus S and the 
motivational properties of the outcome O, without necessarily affecting the association between the 
stimulus and the sensory properties of the outcome. S-O-R theory assumes that PIT effects depend 
on the stimulus S activating only the sensory properties (not the motivational value) of the outcome 
(e.g., Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Rescorla, 1994; van Steenbergen et al., 2017). Hence, if extinction fails 
to weaken the association between the stimulus and the sensory properties of the outcome then S-
O-R theory would not predict a weakening of the PIT effect following extinction. 
It is important to note at this point that, while the majority of studies have failed to detect 
effects of Pavlovian extinction on PIT, there are a few recent exceptions. Bezzina, Lee, Lovibond, and 
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Colagiuri (2016) and Lovibond, Satkunarajah, and Colagiuri (2015) first reported attenuated PIT 
effects in two recent publications with human participants. We shall return to these experiments in 
the General Discussion, since they employed rather different procedures to the outcome-selective 
PIT procedures discussed thus far. More recently, Delamater et al. (2017) reported that extinction 
weakened outcome-selective PIT effects in rats using a Pavlovian conditioning procedure that was 
expected to produce relatively weak Pavlovian conditioning. These studies suggest that outcome-
selective PIT effects can be sensitive to extinction manipulations under certain circumstances. 
The present experiments aimed to shed further light on the conditions that promote 
sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction in outcome-selective PIT experiments with human subjects. To 
anticipate, Experiment 1 replicated Hogarth et al.'s (2014) demonstration of an outcome-selective 
PIT effect that was insensitive to Pavlovian extinction. Experiment 2 explored whether a more 
sensitive transfer test procedure would produce evidence of sensitivity to extinction. This procedural 
difference will be expanded on following presentation of the data from Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 aimed to replicate Hogarth et al.'s (2014) demonstration of insensitivity to 
Pavlovian extinction in a typical outcome-selective PIT task. Table 1 shows the design. In an initial 
instrumental training phase, participants first learnt to perform two instrumental responses (R1 and 
R2) to earn points towards either outcome O1 or O2 (R1-O1, R2-O2). In a separate Pavlovian 
acquisition phase, six neutral cues (A-F) were established as predictors of either outcome O1 or O2. 
Cues A and C served as non-extinguished cues, B and D as extinguished cues, and E and F as filler 
cues. During Pavlovian acquisition, cues A, B, and E were repeatedly presented (one at a time) and 
were followed by outcome O1. Cues C, D and F were similarly presented and were followed by 
outcome O2. In the extinction phase, B and D were then presented and were followed by “nothing”. 
The non-extinguished cues (A and C) were not presented here, so that they did not undergo 
extinction or additional training. The filler cues (E and F) were presented and reinforced during the 
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extinction phase, so that the participants learnt that both outcomes were still available. In the final 
transfer test, the extinguished and non-extinguished cues (A-D) were presented on separate trials 
and instrumental response choice (R1 vs. R2) was tested. The outcomes were not presented during 
the transfer test so that they did not affect response choice.  
 We expected the non-extinguished A and C to produce outcome-selective PIT effects by 
biasing response choice towards the response that predicted the same outcome (R1 and R2, 
respectively). The question was whether the extinguished B and D would produce the same pattern. 
If outcome-selective PIT effects are insensitive to Pavlovian extinction, then the extinguished cues 
should bias response choice to the same extent as the non-extinguished cues. This pattern would 
replicate Hogarth et al.'s (2014) results. Sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction, by contrast, would be 
revealed if the extinguished cues produced smaller PIT effects than the non-extinguished cues. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four participants (12 males, aged between 20 and 69, M = 35.96 years, 
SEM = 3.78 years) were recruited from Plymouth University in exchange for £4. The Plymouth 
University Ethics Committee approved the study. 
Apparatus and materials. The experiment was programmed in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc) and was presented on a 22-inch computer monitor. The text and Pavlovian cues 
were presented on a white background, and responses were made using a standard keyboard. The 
participants wore headphones throughout the experiment. Tyrell’s Lightly Sea Salted Crisps and 
Tyrell’s Sea Salted Popcorn were decanted into separate, transparent containers to serve as props. 
Assignment of crisps and popcorn to the roles of outcomes O1 and O2 was counterbalanced over 
participants. The six Pavlovian cues (A-F; see Table 1) were coloured squares. The colours blue, 
green, pink, purple, red and yellow were randomly assigned to cues A-F for each participant.  
Procedure. Participants were shown the food containers and were told that they could win 
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crisps and popcorn points throughout the experiment. They then sampled the crisps and popcorn in 
a random order and rated how much they would like to eat them (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much). The 
containers were then removed and the experimenter read aloud the instrumental training 
instructions: “You can now earn [O1] and [O2] points by pressing the left and right arrow keys. Your 
task is to learn which keys earn each reward”. The text in brackets was replaced by the appropriate 
outcome (“CRISPS” or “POPCORN”). A choice symbol (“← or →”) was presented on each 
instrumental training trial until either the left or right arrow key (R1/R2) was selected on the 
computer keyboard. The left arrow key (R1) earned points towards outcome O1, and the right arrow 
key (R2) earned points towards outcome O2. The outcomes were available on alternate trials. The 
participants were free to perform either response on each trial, but only one response would be 
rewarded on each trial. We used a forced-choice procedure (see e.g., Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & 
Chase, 2011), where the participants were required to make one response per trial. After a response 
was made, the choice symbol was replaced by the statement, “You earn one [CRISPS/POPCORN] 
point” as appropriate if the participant responded for the available outcome, or “You earn 
NOTHING” if the unavailable outcome was chosen. Rewards were presented as points rather than 
real food outcomes to be consistent with Hogarth et al. (2014), and to avoid a generalised 
devaluation of the outcomes through satiation (see Colagiuri & Lovibond, 2015). Feedback was 
presented centrally for 3000ms. There were 48 instrumental training trials, which were separated by 
random intervals of 750-1250ms.  
Pavlovian training followed the instrumental training phase. The instructions stated: “You 
will now see some different colours. These colours will predict either CRISPS or POPCORN points. 
Your task is to learn which colours predict each reward. To help you learn, you will be asked to 
predict which reward you think the colours predict. At first you will need to guess, but with feedback 
you should be able to learn the relationships between the colours and the rewards.”  
Each trial began with the central presentation of a Pavlovian stimulus. The text, “Which 
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reward will follow?”, was superimposed on the stimulus. Beneath the question appeared the reward 
options (“CRISPS”, “POPCORN”, “NOTHING” and “DON’T KNOW”), arranged vertically. The “DON’T 
KNOW” option was always presented last; the other options were ordered randomly on each trial. 
Options were selected using the mouse. Regardless of the participant’s answer, the outcome text 
read, “[STIMULUS] earns one [OUTCOME] point” or “[STIMULUS] earns NOTHING”, as appropriate 
(see Table 1). The text in brackets was replaced by correct stimulus (e.g., “BLUE”) and outcome (e.g., 
“CRISPS”). Outcome-selective PIT effects are thought to depend on the Pavlovian cues and 
instrumental responses sharing a common outcome. We therefore attempted to keep the language 
relating to the outcomes as similar as possible between the two training phases. Thus, participants 
were presented with the statement that either they or the stimulus “earned” the relevant outcome 
(along with a corresponding picture) in both phases. Incorrect responses (not including “DON’T 
KNOW” responses) produced an error noise. Outcome text was presented for 3000ms. 
The Pavlovian training phase consisted of 72 acquisition trials, followed by 48 extinction 
trials. The acquisition and extinction phases consisted of six blocks each, with each stimulus 
presented twice per block in a random order. The transition from acquisition to extinction appeared 
seamless to participants. Trial types were as in Table 1. The trials were separated by random 
intervals of 750-1250ms. 
After Pavlovian extinction, the transfer test instructions were presented: “You can now 
continue to earn the crisps and popcorn points by pressing the left or right arrow key in the same 
way as before. You will now only be told how many of each reward you have earned at the end of 
the experiment. The colours from the previous stage will also be presented before you choose the 
left or right arrow key.” Each trial began with a Pavlovian cue (A, B, C or D), presented at the top of 
the screen. After 3000ms, the instrumental choice symbol (← or →) appeared beneath the Pavlovian 
stimulus, until R1 or R2 was performed. No feedback was provided. There were eight blocks of eight 
trials, with each cue presented twice per block in a random order. The trials were separated by 
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random intervals of 750-1250ms. 
After the transfer test, the participants completed Pavlovian and instrumental contingency 
knowledge tests. In the Pavlovian knowledge test, four questions were presented in a random order. 
For each question, one Pavlovian stimulus (A, B, C or D) was presented, along with the question, 
“Which reward did [STIMULUS COLOUR] produce?” Participants chose one of three options (CRISPS, 
POPCORN and NOTHING) using the mouse, and then rated their confidence in this choice (1 = Not at 
all confident, 7 = Very confident). In the instrumental knowledge test, two questions were presented 
in a random order: “Which key earned [CRISPS/POPCORN], the left or right arrow key?” Participants 
selected a response using the keyboard, and again rated their confidence. Finally, participants 
completed four expectancy ratings in a random order. A stimulus (A, B, C or D) was presented on 
each trial, along with the question, “When the colour [STIMULUS COLOUR] was presented, to what 
extent did you think you were more likely to earn [CRISPS/POPCORN]?” The outcome in this 
question (crisps/popcorn) was always the correct outcome for that stimulus. For example, if the blue 
square had predicted crisps points, then expectancy ratings were recorded for crisps rather than 
popcorn (even if the blue-crisps contingency had been extinguished). Expectancy ratings were on a 
scale from one (Not at all) to seven (Very much). 
 Reward points were not translated into real rewards, but the participants were offered 
chocolate at the end of the experiment (regardless of their points tally).  
Results 
Liking ratings for outcomes O1 (M = 4.71, SEM = 0.30) and O2 (M = 4.42, SEM = 0.24) did not 
significantly differ, t < 1. During instrumental training, choice of the R1 (M = 49.13%, SEM = 2.15%) 
versus R2 response did not significantly differ from 50%, t < 1. Furthermore, 87.50% of participants 
reported perfect instrumental contingency knowledge. Confidence ratings for O1 (M = 5.71, SEM = 
0.28) and O2 (M = 5.75, SEM = 0.26) did not significantly differ, t < 1.  
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  Figure 1a shows the percentage of correct predictions made during Pavlovian training. 
During acquisition, the correct prediction for cue B and D was O1 and O2, respectively, and these 
changed to ‘nothing’ in extinction. Prediction accuracy for the non-extinguished (A and C), 
extinguished (B and D), and filler (E and F) cues did not significantly differ (ts < 1.25, ps > .22). The 
cues within each cue type were therefore collapsed for presentation. Most importantly, the 
participants learnt to correctly predict that B and D earned ‘nothing’ during extinction. Accuracy on 
the final block did not significantly differ on B/D and E/F trials, t (23) = 1.37, p = .19, Cohen’s dz = 
0.28. Furthermore, 83.33% of the sample reported perfect knowledge of the Pavlovian contingencies 
(cues A-D) in the final Pavlovian knowledge test1. Unsurprisingly, the participants were more 
confident in their knowledge of the non-extinguished contingencies (M = 6.31, SEM = 0.16) than the 
extinguished contingencies (M = 5.40, SEM = 0.21), t (47) = 4.65, p < .001, dz = 0.79. Similarly, 
expectancy ratings were higher for the non-extinguished cues (M = 6.25, SEM = 0.24) than the 
extinguished cues (M = 5.06, SEM = 0.32), t (23) = 3.07, p = .005, dz = 0.63. 
The results of most interest are from the transfer test, shown in Figure 1b. We used a 
balanced design, where outcomes paired with each instrumental response were counterbalanced 
between-subjects. Across participants, baseline response choice in the absence of any cues must, 
therefore, logically sit at 50%. The graph suggests that each stimulus biased response choice away 
from this 50% indifference point and towards the associated outcome, regardless of whether that 
stimulus was extinguished or not. Since there were an equal number of male and female 
participants, gender was also included as a between-subjects factor in the analysis. A stimulus (A/B 
vs C/D) × extinction (A/C vs B/D) × gender (male vs female) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
stimulus, F (1, 22) = 39.22, p < .001, generalised eta squared ( 2
G ) = .58, with A and B producing 
more R1 responses than C and D. There was no significant main effect of extinction or gender, Fs < 1, 
                                                          
1 Both “O1” and “Nothing” were regarded as correct responses for cue B. Likewise, both “O2” and “Nothing” 
were considered correct for cue D. 
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nor were there any significant interactions, (Fs < 2.99, ps > .10). The non-significant stimulus × 
extinction interaction was supported by a Bayes Factor (BF10) of 0.35, which favours the null 
hypothesis (JASP Team, 2018).  
Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we observed an outcome-selective PIT effect: the Pavlovian cues selectively 
biased instrumental response choice towards the response that predicted the same outcome in the 
transfer test. The magnitude of this PIT effect was not significantly diminished by the extinction 
procedure; there was no significant difference in the extent to which the extinguished and non-
extinguished cues biased response choice, despite the extinguished cues producing no outcomes 
during the extinction phase. The participants learned to accurately predict “no outcome” to the 
extinguished cues very well during the extinction phase, so the strong PIT effect despite extinction of 
cues B and D cannot readily be attributed to poor learning during the extinction phase. The results 
replicate Hogarth et al.'s (2014) findings and are consistent with the claim that outcome-selective 
PIT effects are robust against Pavlovian extinction treatments. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, Pavlovian extinction had little impact on the ability of the Pavlovian cues to 
drive outcome-selective PIT. This is consistent with previous studies with both rats (Delamater, 
1996) and humans (Hogarth et al., 2014; Rosas et al., 2010). A common feature of these studies is 
that the Pavlovian cues were presented individually during the transfer test. This is one potential 
reason for the observed insensitivity to extinction; perhaps PIT transfer tests are especially sensitive 
to the presence of cues that signal outcomes, even if those signals are relatively weak. Even an 
extinguished cue might elicit a PIT effect when it is the only cue present and only one outcome is 
signalled. It has been argued that PIT effects reflect a tendency for participants to infer that the 
Pavlovian cues signal which outcomes are available on any given trial during the transfer test, and 
which ones are not (Cartoni, Moretta, Puglisi-Allegra, Cabib, & Baldassarre, 2015; Hogarth et al., 
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2014; Seabrooke, Hogarth, & Mitchell, 2016; Seabrooke et al., 2017).  When only one stimulus 
(which signals a single outcome) is presented on each trial during the transfer test, participants 
might infer that the cued outcome is the only available outcome. Hence, responding during the 
transfer test may be particularly sensitive to Pavlovian cues (even those with low associative 
strength) during typical transfer tests, because participants choose to respond for what they 
consider to be the only available outcome. As a consequence, typical PIT transfer tests (such as that 
used in Experiment 1) may be commensurately insensitive to differences between the associative 
strengths of extinguished and non-extinguished cues. 
The implication of the above argument is that a more sensitive transfer test might reveal 
evidence for an effect of extinction on outcome-selective PIT. Experiment 2 investigated this 
possibility, using a transfer test that was based on a procedure originally used with rats by Rescorla 
(1994). The design, shown in Table 1, was the same as in Experiment 1, except that compound rather 
than single cues were presented during the transfer test. Thus, response choice during the transfer 
test was tested in the presence of one of two stimulus compounds: AD or BC. These stimulus 
compounds both contain one element that was earlier paired with the outcome (O1) produced by 
response R1, and one element that was paired with the outcome (O2) produced by R2. In each 
compound, one of these elements has previously undergone Pavlovian extinction, and the other has 
not. If outcome-selective PIT is truly insensitive to extinction, then the stimulus compounds should 
not bias response choice in either direction. Consider compound AD: if A (non-extinguished) 
promotes choice of R1 just as strongly as D (extinguished) promotes choice of R2, then participants 
should be equally likely to make response R1 as response R2. In contrast, if S-O extinction weakens 
the PIT effect, then instrumental responding should be biased towards the outcome signalled by the 
non-extinguished cues A and C. For example, the non-extinguished cue A in the compound AD will 
produce a bias towards R1 responding due to the shared outcome O1. Likewise, BC will produce a 
bias towards R2. The side-by-side presentation of one extinguished and one non-extinguished 
stimulus, which are associated with different responses (via different mediating outcomes), might 
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promote comparison and contrast of the two response options, thereby increasing the sensitivity of 
the test.  
Method 
The method was the same as Experiment 1, except in the following respects. 
Participants. Twenty-four Plymouth University psychology undergraduates (20 females, 
aged between 18 and 44, M = 22.25 years, SEM = 1.48 years) took part for course credit. 
 Procedure. The transfer test instructions were the same as those given in Experiment 1, 
except that the participants were also told that the coloured squares would appear at the top and 
bottom of the screen, and that the location of the colours (top or bottom) was not important. Cues A 
and D were presented on half of the trials; B and C were presented on the remaining trials. The 
location of the cues (top/bottom) was counterbalanced, thereby creating four trial types (AD and BC, 
with counterbalanced cue location). Each trial type was presented once per block in a random order, 
and there were eight blocks. The transfer test was preceded by one practice block. 
Results 
Liking ratings for outcomes O1 (M = 4.50, SEM = 0.29) and O2 (M = 4.42, SEM = 0.35) did not 
significantly differ, t < 1. During instrumental training, choice of the R1 (M = 51.65%, SEM = 1.56%) 
versus R2 response did not significantly differ from 50%, t (23) = 1.06, p = .30. Furthermore, 87.50% 
of the sample reported perfect instrumental contingency knowledge. Confidence ratings for O1 (M = 
5.42, SEM = 0.29) and O2 (M = 5.38, SEM = 0.29) did not significantly differ, t < 1.  
Figure 2a shows the percentage of correct predictions made during Pavlovian training. 
During acquisition, the correct prediction for cues B and D was O1 and O2, respectively, and these 
changed to ‘nothing’ in extinction. Prediction accuracy for the non-extinguished (A and C), 
extinguished (B and D), and filler (E and F) cues did not significantly differ (ts < 1). The cues within 
each cue type were therefore collapsed for presentation. Most importantly, the participants learnt 
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to correctly predict that B and D earned ‘nothing’ during extinction. Accuracy on the final block did 
not significantly differ on B/D and E/F trials, t < 1. Furthermore, 83.33% of participants reported 
perfect knowledge of the Pavlovian contingencies in the Pavlovian knowledge test (scored as in 
Experiment 1). Participants were more confident in their knowledge of the non-extinguished 
contingencies (M = 5.88, SEM = 0.20) than the extinguished contingencies (M = 4.98, SEM = 0.16), t 
(47) = 4.01, p < .001, dz = 0.70. Expectancy ratings were also higher for non-extinguished stimuli (M = 
5.83, SEM = 0.27) than extinguished stimuli (M = 4.15, SEM = 0.25), t (23) = 4.92, p < .001, dz = 1.00. 
The results of greatest importance are those from the transfer test (Figure 2b). Most 
importantly, the stimulus compounds selectively biased response choice toward the response that 
was associated with the same outcome as the non-extinguished stimulus. That is, AD produced more 
R1 responses than BC, t (23) = 4.75, p < .001, dz = 0.97. Furthermore, the AD compound increased R1 
responses relative to the 50% indifference point, t (23) = 4.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.98. Conversely, 
the BC compound increased R2 responses relative to the 50% indifference point, t (23) = 3.76, p 
= .001, d = 0.77. 
Discussion 
When both extinguished and non-extinguished cues were presented together during the 
transfer test, instrumental response choice was biased towards the response that earned the same 
outcome as the non-extinguished stimulus. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
demonstration of an outcome-selective, appetitive PIT effect that was sensitive to Pavlovian 
extinction in human subjects. Furthermore, the results compliment and extend Delamater et al.'s 
(2017) studies with rats, by demonstrating another condition in which outcome-selective PIT effects 
are sensitive to Pavlovian extinction treatments. 
The only difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was the nature of the transfer test. In 
Experiment 1, instrumental response choice was tested in the presence of a single Pavlovian 
stimulus that either had or had not undergone Pavlovian extinction. Experiment 2, by contrast, used 
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a more sensitive test procedure in which instrumental response choice was assessed in the presence 
of compound stimuli that included both extinguished and non-extinguished cues. The results of 
Experiment 2 suggest that PIT effects are sensitive to Pavlovian extinction when this more sensitive 
test procedure is used. 
There is a question, however, as to why response choice was sensitive to Pavlovian 
extinction in Experiment 2. One possibility is that response choice was driven by the associative 
strength of the stimuli presented on test. The extinction manipulation would be expected to reduce 
the associative strength of the extinguished stimuli relative to the non-extinguished stimuli. This 
difference in associative strength might then have produced the observed response bias, with the 
non-extinguished stimuli dominating instrumental response choice. This account would be 
consistent with the S-O-R theory, since the extinguished cues should activate the associated 
outcomes less than the non-extinguished cues.  
Another possibility is that instrumental response choice was indirectly driven by the salience 
of the Pavlovian cues in each compound. Following Mackintosh (1975), extinction might be expected 
to reduce the salience of the extinguished cues by reducing their predictiveness with respect to the 
outcomes (see Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016, for a review), thus reducing the 
extent to which these cues were able to control responding on test. Hence, the results of Experiment 
2 could have been driven by an attentional bias towards the more salient, non-extinguished cues 
during the transfer test. Experiment 3 tested this possibility. 
Experiment 3 
The concept for Experiment 3 runs as follows. As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants first 
learn to perform two instrumental responses to earn different rewarding outcomes (R1 – O1, R2 – 
O2). In a separate Pavlovian acquisition phase, participants learn that cue A predicts both outcomes 
O1 and O2 (A-O1 and A-O2). Suppose that, in a subsequent Pavlovian extinction phase, we can 
extinguish the A-O2 relationship while keeping the A-O1 relationship intact. In a final transfer test, 
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we then measure the influence of cue A on instrumental choice of response R1 or R2. If outcome-
selective PIT is sensitive to extinction, then we should observe a bias towards R1, because cue A 
signals O1 more strongly than O2 (since the A-O2 relationship was extinguished) and R1 earns the 
more strongly predicted O1. Critically, such an effect could not be due to an attentional bias because 
the same stimulus, cue A, is part of both the non-extinguished and the extinguished relationship (A-
O1 and A-O2, respectively).  
Of course, extinguishing one A-outcome relationship but not the other is not 
straightforward. One option would be to present both outcomes O1 and O2 following cue A during 
acquisition (A-O1 and A-O2 trials), and then follow cue A with only O1 during extinction (A-O1 trials). 
This would certainly maintain the A-O1 relationship and extinguish the A-O2 relationship. However, 
any response bias during the transfer test might be due to the additional A-O1 pairings rather than 
the extinction of A-O2. We opted for a different approach. During training, only one outcome was 
potentially available on each trial. This was indicated by a closed box with the outcome written on 
the lid. On each trial, a cue (e.g., cue A) and a box with an outcome (e.g., O1) indicated on the lid was 
presented. Participants were asked to predict whether the box actually contained the specified 
outcome. Once that prediction was made, the lid would open and the contents were revealed (O1 
could be either present or absent). Hence, each trial was specific to each outcome, which meant that 
the A-O1 and A-O2 contingencies could be trained separately. Most importantly, the A-O2 
contingency could be extinguished without affecting the A-O1 contingency. That is, when cue A 
appeared with the empty O2 box, it should weaken the A-O2 relationship. The A-O1 relationship, by 
contrast, should be unaffected because O1 was not available on that trial. 
Table 3 shows the full design of Experiment 3. Pavlovian trials shown in bold implement the 
design described above for both cue A and B. The A-O2 and B-O1 contingencies were extinguished, 
so we would expect an R1 and R2 bias on transfer trials with A and B, respectively. The rationale for 
cues C and D and outcome O3 is as follows. Cues A and B were paired with outcome O3 (A-O3 and B-
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O3) across both Pavlovian acquisition and extinction to prevent participants from learning, in the 
extinction phase, that A and B no longer signalled outcomes in general. The C-O1 and C-O2 
contingencies, which were also consistent throughout both Pavlovian acquisition and extinction, 
signalled that outcomes O1 and O2 could still occur during the extinction phase (though they were 
never available on A or B trials). The remaining trials (C-no O3, D-no O1, D-no O2, and D-no O3) were 
included so that participants did not simply answer “yes” to every question in the acquisition phase. 
In the transfer test, instrumental response choice (R1 vs. R2) was tested in the presence of cue A or 
B2.   
As noted above, sensitivity to the Pavlovian extinction manipulation would be revealed if 
cues A and B selectively increased the instrumental response with which they shared a non-
extinguished outcome. That is, sensitivity to the extinction manipulation would be revealed if A 
increased choice of the R1 response relative to B. This effect could not be ascribed to an attentional 
bias. Insensitivity to extinction, by contrast, would be revealed if A and B failed to bias response 
choice in either direction. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four UNSW Sydney students (20 females, aged between 18 and 21, M = 
18.67 years, SEM = 0.19 years) took part for course credit. The experiment was approved by the 
UNSW Sydney Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel (Psychology).  
Apparatus and materials. Stimuli were presented on a 23-inch monitor. Bags of Kettle Sea 
Salt Crisps, Cobs Sea Salt Popcorn, and Nobby’s Salted Cashews served as props during the initial 
liking ratings. The three food rewards (crisps, popcorn, and cashews) were randomly allocated to the 
                                                          
2 Cue C was also presented on filler trials during the transfer test. We did not expect C to bias 
response choice, because it predicted both O1 and O2 equally during Pavlovian training. As expected, C did not 
significantly bias responding in either direction (mean percent choice of R1: 50.78%, SEM: 7.94%).  
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three outcomes for each participant. The four colours of the coloured squares used for Pavlovian 
cues (A-D; see Table 2) were blue, pink, red and yellow; these were randomly assigned to the roles 
of cues A-D for each participant. Other aspects were as for Experiments 1 and 2. 
Procedure. The participants were first shown the three food rewards that were available to 
win, and provided liking ratings for each. The experimenter then removed the food props and read 
aloud the instrumental training instructions: “You can now earn [O1] and [O2] points by pressing the 
left and right arrow keys. You will see two closed boxes on each trial, one for each reward. After you 
choose a response, the contents of your chosen box will be revealed. Your task is to learn which keys 
earn each reward.” The text in brackets was replaced by the appropriate outcome (“CRISPS”, 
“POPCORN” or “CASHEWS”). There were 24 trials of instrumental training. Each trial began with two 
grey, closed boxes that were presented on either side of a choice symbol (← or →). The name of 
outcome O1 (e.g., “CRISPS”) was superimposed on the left-hand box; the name of O2 was shown on 
the right-hand box. After either the left or right arrow key (R1/R2) was selected, the corresponding 
box “opened” (i.e., it turned white) to reveal the contents. The other box remained closed. The left 
and right arrow keys served as R1 and R2, respectively. The R1 and R2 responses were selectively 
paired with outcomes O1 and O2, respectively. Each outcome was available on a randomly 
distributed half of the trials each. Thus, there was a 50% probability that a given response would 
produce the corresponding outcome on any given trial. When the participant responded for an 
available outcome, a picture of that outcome was presented “inside” the corresponding box, and the 
text, “You earn one [CRISPS/POPCORN/CASHEWS] point” appeared. When the participant responded 
for an unavailable outcome, the corresponding box appeared to be empty and the text read, “You 
earn NOTHING”. The outcomes were presented for 1500ms. 
Pavlovian training followed instrumental training. Figure 3 shows an example training trial. 
The instructions were similar to the previous experiments; the participants were told that they 
would see different colours, which would predict points towards crisps, popcorn and cashew nuts. 
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The participants were told that their task was to learn which colour predicted each reward, and that 
they would be asked to predict whether the outcome shown would be received on each trial. There 
were 144 trials of Pavlovian training, which consisted of 96 acquisition trials, followed by 48 
extinction trials. 
Each Pavlovian trial began with the central presentation of one of the Pavlovian cues 
(coloured squares). A closed box (which was identical to those used during instrumental training) 
was superimposed on the stimulus. Below the box appeared the question, “Will [COLOUR] earn 
[OUTCOME]?” The text in brackets was replaced by the appropriate colour or outcome. The 
corresponding outcome was also written on top of the box, as in the instrumental training phase. 
“YES”, “NO” and “DON’T KNOW” options were superimposed on the stimulus, arranged vertically. 
After a response was made using the mouse, the correct outcome was revealed. An “open” box 
replaced the closed box. If the outcome was available, a corresponding picture was also presented 
within the box. Finally, the outcome was confirmed with the text, “[COLOUR] earns one [OUTCOME] 
point”, or “[COLOUR] earns NO [OUTCOME] points” if the stimulus did not predict the outcome. The 
text in brackets was replaced by the appropriate colour and outcome, and the outcome was 
presented in bold. Incorrect predictions (not including “DON’T KNOW” responses) were followed by 
error noises. Visual feedback was presented for 1500ms. 
The Pavlovian acquisition phase consisted of four blocks of 12 trial types (see Table 2). Each 
trial type was presented twice per block (96 trials total). The Pavlovian extinction phase consisted of 
four blocks of six trial types. The six trial types were presented twice per block (48 trials total).  
To minimise the possibility of participants forgetting the instrumental contingencies, a 
booster instrumental training session was administered immediately after the Pavlovian training 
phase (see Allman et al., 2010 and Eder and Dignath, 2016a, 2016b for similar procedures). The 
booster session was identical to the first instrumental training phase. Critically, no Pavlovian cues 
were presented during this phase; participants never performed the instrumental responses in the 
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presence of the cues before the transfer test. 
The transfer test followed the booster instrumental session. It followed a similar format to 
the previous experiments; the participants were told that they could continue earning outcomes O1 
and O2 by pressing the left and right arrow keys, and that they would be told how many of each 
reward they had earned at the end of the experiment. Each trial began with either cue A, B or C 
being presented alone for 1000ms. The choice symbol (← or →) then appeared until a response was 
selected. The cues were presented twice per block in random order, and there were eight blocks. 
The participants completed one practice block before the real transfer test. 
The participants completed a Pavlovian knowledge test after the transfer test. A Pavlovian 
cue (A or B) was presented on each trial, along with the question, “Did [COLOUR] earn [O1/O2]?” 
The text in brackets was replaced by the appropriate colour and outcome. The participants chose 
either “Yes” or “No”, and then rated their confidence (1 = Not at all confident; 7 = Very confident). 
Knowledge of the A-O1, A-O2, B-O1 and B-O2 relationships was tested in a random order. 
We then administered an instrumental knowledge test. Two questions were presented in a 
random order: “Which key earned [O1/O2], the left or right arrow key?” The outcome was replaced 
by the appropriate food (crisps, popcorn or cashews) for each question. Confidence ratings were 
taken after each question (1 = Not at all confident; 7 = Very confident). 
Finally, expectancy ratings were recorded for the A-O1, A-O2, B-O1, and B-O2 contingencies. 
Four questions were presented in a random order: “When the colour [COLOUR] was presented, to 
what extent did you think that you were more likely to earn [OUTCOME]?” Expectancies were rated 
between one (“Not at all”) and seven (“Very much”). 
 Throughout the experiment, the trials were separated by random intervals of 350-750ms. 
Results 
 Liking ratings for the three outcomes (M = 4.69, SEM = 0.17) did not significantly differ, F < 1. 
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During instrumental training, choice of the R1 (M = 50.52%, SEM = 3.31%) versus R2 response did 
not significantly differ from 50%, t < 1.  Furthermore, 87.50% of the sample reported perfect 
instrumental contingency knowledge. Confidence ratings for O1 (M = 4.83, SEM = 0.45) and O2 (M = 
4.75, SEM = 0.46) did not significantly differ, t < 1. 
 Figure 4a shows the percentage of correct predictions made during Pavlovian training. The 
filler trials involving cues C and D are omitted for clarity. Most importantly, the participants learnt to 
accurately predict that cues A and B did not predict outcomes O2 and O1, respectively, during the 
extinction phase. Accuracy on the final block did not significantly differ between trial types, F (2, 46) 
= 1.26, p = .29, 2
G  = .03. Furthermore, 87.50% of participants reported perfect knowledge of the 
non-extinguished contingencies (A-O1 and B-O2) in the Pavlovian knowledge test. With respect to 
the extinguished contingencies, 62.50% of participants thought that cues A and B did not predict O2 
and O1, respectively. A stimulus (A vs. B) × outcome (O1 vs. O2) repeated measures ANOVA on the 
confidence ratings revealed no significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 2.45, ps > .13).  
 Figure 4b shows the percent choice of R1 versus R2 on A and B trials during the transfer test. 
Most importantly, cue A increased choice of response R1 relative to cue B, t (23) = 5.46, p < .001, dz = 
1.11. Furthermore, cue A increased choice of R1 relative to the 50% indifference point, t (23) = 2.33, 
p = .03, d = 0.48. Conversely, cue B increased choice of R2 relative to 50%, t (23) = 8.64, p < .001, d = 
1.76. 
 Figure 4c shows the mean expectancy ratings for the critical Pavlovian contingencies. The 
graph suggests that participants gave higher ratings for the non-extinguished (A-O1 and B-O2) 
contingencies than the extinguished (A-O2, B-O1) contingencies. To confirm, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the stimulus (A and B) and outcome (O1 and O2) factors revealed a stimulus × outcome 
interaction, F (1, 23) = 13.70, p = .001, 2
G  = .20. In the presence of cue A, participants expected to 
earn outcome O1 more than O2, t (23) = 2.33, p = .03, dz = 0.48. Conversely, higher expectancy 




In Experiment 3, two instrumental responses were trained to predict different rewarding 
outcomes (R1-O1, R2-O2). The critical Pavlovian cues (A and B) also predicted both of these 
outcomes (A-O1, A-O2, B-O1, B-O2). During the Pavlovian extinction phase, one contingency 
involving each Pavlovian cue was extinguished, such that A and B no longer predicted O2 and O1, 
respectively. On test, instrumental response choice was sensitive to the extinction manipulation; cue 
A increased R1 responding relative to cue B. This sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction is consistent with 
the results of Experiment 2, and it cannot be readily explained by cue salience3. Rather, the PIT 
effect appears to be a direct effect of the associative strength of the Pavlovian cues. 
General Discussion 
Three experiments examined the effect of Pavlovian extinction on human outcome-selective 
PIT. Experiment 1 employed a traditional PIT procedure and replicated previous demonstrations that 
PIT is insensitive to Pavlovian extinction (Hogarth et al., 2014; Rosas et al., 2010). It also highlighted 
the parallel between human and animal PIT studies; insensitivity to extinction has been seen across 
different species, with different testing methodologies. We speculated that the typical PIT 
procedure, in which a single Pavlovian cue is presented per trial, might be insufficiently sensitive to 
detect effects of Pavlovian extinction. One way to increase the sensitivity of a test to the difference 
between two cues is to force a choice between those cues. This is exactly the approach Rescorla 
(1994) adopted to test for effects of outcome devaluation on PIT. In Experiments 2 and 3 here, 
therefore, we used an analogous forced-choice approach to examine the effect of Pavlovian 
                                                          
3 We do not wish to imply here that reward-predictive cues do not preferentially capture attention. 
Indeed, there is very good evidence to suggest that such cues do command attention (Le Pelley et al., 2016), 
and these attentional biases may well play an important role in some extinction effects (e.g., Robbins, 1990). 
Nevertheless, the PIT effect observed in Experiment 3 appears to be independent of any effects of cue 




extinction on PIT. These two experiments revealed clear evidence of outcome-selective PIT effects 
that were sensitive to Pavlovian extinction. We therefore suggest that human outcome-selective PIT 
effects are influenced by Pavlovian extinction, but that the test used in Experiment 1 was not 
sensitive enough to detect an effect. This conclusion is consistent with both Delamater et al.'s (2017) 
results and the predictions of S-O-R theory. 
Of course, we are not the first to demonstrate that cue-elicited instrumental responding can 
be weakened by extinction. Notably, Lovibond and colleagues reported PIT effects that were 
attenuated by Pavlovian extinction treatments in two recent publications (Bezzina et al., 2016; 
Lovibond et al., 2015). However, these studies both employed “single-lever” designs that measured 
the extent to which extinguished and non-extinguished cues boosted the rate of a single 
instrumental response. These procedures were therefore not designed to measure outcome-
selective PIT, in which a Pavlovian stimulus boosts instrumental responding for the outcome with 
which it was previously associated, but not responding for other outcomes. The single-lever designs 
could, in principle, operate through an entirely different mechanism from that responsible for 
outcome-selective PIT, one that does not rely on the specific outcome with which the stimulus and 
response are associated. For example, the effect observed by Lovibond and his colleagues might be 
the consequence of the stimulus activating a general motivational state (e.g., Rescorla & Solomon, 
1967). Hence, any effects of S-O extinction on this motivational state would not necessarily have 
implications for the effects of extinction in outcome-selective PIT. S-O-R theory is specifically a 
model of outcome-selective PIT (Trapold & Overmier, 1972), because it assumes that Pavlovian cues 
will activate only associated outcome representations. The current findings, that outcome-selective 
PIT is sensitive to Pavlovian extinction, therefore provide novel support for S-O-R theory. 
We mentioned in the Introduction that S-O-R theory could be reconciled with the previous 
demonstrations of insensitivity to Pavlovian extinction by assuming that Pavlovian extinction fails to 
weaken the association between the Pavlovian stimulus S and the sensory properties of the 
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outcome O (Delamater & Westbrook, 2014). In the current Experiments 2 and 3, we observed 
outcome-selective PIT effects that were sensitive to the Pavlovian extinction procedures. These 
results are therefore consistent with a simple version of S-O-R theory, in which Pavlovian extinction 
would be expected to weaken PIT effects by degrading the association between the Pavlovian 
stimulus S and both the sensory and motivational properties of the outcome O. 
 To what extent do our results affect the interpretation of other accounts of PIT? Hierarchical 
S:R-O theory is one such account (Cartoni et al., 2015; Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Hardy, Mitchell, 
Seabrooke, & Hogarth, 2017; Hogarth et al., 2014; Hogarth & Troisi, 2015; Rescorla, 1991), and it 
differs from S-O-R theory in two key ways. First, the hierarchical account of PIT suggests that 
instrumental responding is the consequence of the response-outcome (R-O) relationship rather than 
the O-R link postulated by S-O-R theory. Second, the Pavlovian S-O pairings allow the stimulus S to 
act as a discriminative stimulus or “occasion setter” for the instrumental response (as opposed to 
the S activating the outcome representation, as in S-O-R theory). This means that the Pavlovian 
stimuli signal which response will produce an outcome (S:R-O) in PIT transfer tests. Hierarchical 
theory originates from studies on non-human animals (e.g., Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Rescorla, 1991) 
and, as a consequence, is often suggested to be “associative” in nature. The associative mechanism 
by which S-O pairings allow the stimulus S to serve as an occasion setter (that is, how the S:R-O 
structure emerges from S-O and R-O training) is not well specified. Whatever the precise 
mechanism, the Pavlovian stimuli are thought to gain control over the instrumental contingencies 
that share an outcome (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010). Occasion setters are known to be unaffected by 
simple extinction (Holland, 1989). The hierarchical model of PIT therefore suggests that simply 
extinguishing a Pavlovian S-O relation should not alter the extent to which the stimulus S produces a 
PIT effect (Hogarth et al., 2014). Hierarchical S:R-O theory would, therefore, require further 
modification (perhaps in terms of specifying the way in which S-O and R-O training results in the S:R-
O structure) to account for the sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction observed in Experiments 2 and 3. 
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 A third theory of PIT is our goal-directed, propositional model (Hogarth et al., 2014; 
Seabrooke et al., 2016, 2017). Similar to hierarchical theory, participants are assumed to infer that 
the Pavlovian stimuli signal which outcomes are more available, and therefore which instrumental 
response is more likely to be reinforced on any given test trial. Thus, human PIT effects are 
suggested to reflect a controlled decision-making process rather than an automatic priming 
mechanism. In contrast to hierarchical theory, the propositional approach expects that S-O 
extinction would weaken PIT effects, because it should weaken the belief that the stimulus signals 
that the associated outcome is available. The sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction that was seen in 
Experiments 2 and 3 is therefore consistent with the propositional model of PIT. 
The issue remaining for proponents of the propositional account of PIT is to more tightly 
specify the meaning of “outcome availability”. Availability relates to the ease with which an outcome 
can be earned. A cue that signals increased outcome availability in a transfer test is not a pure 
Pavlovian cue because the outcome is not simply delivered; an action is also required. Such a cue is 
not a discriminative stimulus (in the usual sense) either, however, because its relationship is with the 
outcome rather than a specific response. One way to characterise this approach is as a combination 
of both the S-O-R and hierarchical accounts of PIT. The first component is similar to the idea in S-O-R 
theory, that the stimulus activates the associated outcome representation. Hence, participants have 
an increased expectancy that the cued outcome is close by, or can be earned more easily than a non-
cued outcome. Unlike in S-O-R theory, however, the outcome expectancy does not trigger the 
response directly. Rather, and this is the second component, instrumental responses (actions) are 
the consequence of participants acting in a goal-directed, intentional manner to obtain the outcome 
(similar to the R-O relationship postulated in S:R-O theory). Responses will then be based on (some 
function of) the probability of obtaining the outcome and the value of that outcome. This approach 
allows us to account for both the sensitivity of outcome-selective PIT to extinction (in the current 
experiments) and outcome devaluation (in our previous work: Seabrooke et al., 2017). Extinction 
decreases the perceived probability of the outcome being earned (i.e., its availability) and 
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devaluation decreases the perceived value of the outcome. According to our propositional model of 
PIT, both manipulations should decrease the likelihood that participants will respond to earn that 
outcome.  
Of the three theories outlined above, our feeling is that the propositional model of PIT fairs 
best in the face of the data. First, although S-O-R theory predicts the current extinction result, it 
does not readily account for the effects of outcome devaluation seen by Seabrooke et al. (2017), 
because the Pavlovian stimuli are assumed to activate only the sensory properties (not the current 
incentive value) of the associated outcome (e.g., Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Rescorla, 1994; van 
Steenbergen et al., 2017). Second, hierarchical S:R-O theory provides no obvious mechanism by 
which S-O extinction might weaken PIT effects (or indeed why S-O pairings should result in S:R-O 
knowledge in the first place). The propositional model of PIT appears to be consistent with the 
effects of both extinction and outcome devaluation. It suggests that participants infer that a 
Pavlovian stimulus signals that the associated outcome is now more available and therefore more 
likely to be earned. So long as the outcome is valued, then participants should act to obtain that 
outcome. Both extinction and outcome devaluation should, therefore, weaken PIT effects (as 
observed) via reductions in perceived availability and value, respectively.   
It might be questioned whether the propositional theory of PIT is also relevant to non-
human PIT effects. In truth, we have few data that speak to this issue at present. However, if 
researchers are interested in determining whether human and non-human PIT effects are mediated 
by a common mechanism, we suggest that the focus should be on Rescorla's (1994) results. Here, 
Rescorla demonstrated insensitivity to outcome devaluation in rats, whereas we saw sensitivity to 
devaluation in a similar experiment with human participants (Seabrooke et al., 2017). On the face of 
it, these studies therefore suggest that human and non-human PIT effects might reflect different 
mechanisms. It would be worth exploring the parameters of these effects further. For example, 
more sensitive test procedures might reveal evidence of sensitivity to devaluation in rats. Likewise, 
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certain conditions (e.g., stress; Pritchard, Weidemann, & Hogarth, 2017) might reveal insensitivity to 
outcome devaluation in human PIT tasks. 
At least with respect to human PIT effects, the propositional model outlined above opens up 
the associative effect of PIT to more mainstream cognitive analysis. This seems appropriate, as the 
choices made in outcome-selective PIT procedures seem very similar to those made in studies of 
judgement and decision making. Bringing concepts from the judgement and decision making 
literature to bear on “associative” effects would be a potentially fruitful development for the future. 
Of course, this cross-talk can work both ways. To the extent that PIT is found to be automatic, it 
might represent a domain in which associative theorists can contribute to the dual-systems debate 
in decision-making (Evans, 2008). We would suggest that this depends on future research 





Alarcón, D. E., & Bonardi, C. (2016). The effect of conditoned inhibition on the specific Pavlovian-
instrumental transfer effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and 
Cognition, 42(1), 82–94. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xan0000087 
Alarcón, D. E., Bonardi, C., & Delamater, A. R. (2017). Associative mechanisms involved in specific 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) in human learning tasks. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1342671 
Allman, M. J., DeLeon, I. G., Cataldo, M. F., Holland, P. C., & Johnson, A. W. (2010). Learning 
processes affecting human decision making: An assessment of reinforcer-selective Pavlovian-
to-instrumental transfer following reinforcer devaluation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal Behavior Processes, 36(3), 402–408. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017876 
Asratyan, E. A. (1974). Conditional reflex theory and motivational behavior. Acta Neurobiologiae 
Experimentalis, 34(1), 15–31. 
Baguley, T. (2012). Calculating and graphing within-subject confidence intervals for ANOVA. Behavior 
Research Methods, 44(1), 158–175. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-011-0123-7 
Balleine, B. W., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). Human and rodent homologies in action control: 
Corticostriatal determinants of goal-directed and habitual action. Neuropsychopharmacology, 
35(1), 48–69. https://doi.org/10.1038/npp.2009.131 
Bezzina, L., Lee, J. C., Lovibond, P. F., & Colagiuri, B. (2016). Extinction and renewal of cue-elicited 
reward-seeking. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 87, 162–169. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2016.09.009 
Cartoni, E., Moretta, T., Puglisi-Allegra, S., Cabib, S., & Baldassarre, G. (2015). The relationship 
between specific pavlovian instrumental transfer and instrumental reward probability. 
30 
 
Frontiers in Psychology, 6(NOV), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01697 
Cohen-Hatton, S. R., Haddon, J. E., George, D. N., & Honey, R. C. (2013). Pavlovian-to-instrumental 
transfer: Paradoxical effects of the Pavlovian relationship explained. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 39(1), 14–23. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030594 
Colagiuri, B., & Lovibond, P. F. (2015). How food cues can enhance and inhibit motivation to obtain 
and consume food. Appetite, 84, 79–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2014.09.023 
Colwill, R. M., & Rescorla, R. A. (1988). Associations between the discriminative stimulus and the 
reinforcer in instrumental learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes, 14(2), 155–164. https://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.14.2.155 
Colwill, R. M., & Rescorla, R. A. (1990). Evidence for the hierarchical structure of instrumental 
learning. Animal Learning & Behavior, 18(1), 71–82. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03205241 
Corbit, L. H., Janak, P. H., & Balleine, B. W. (2007). General and outcome-specific forms of Pavlovian-
instrumental transfer: The effect of shifts in motivational state and inactivation of the ventral 
tegmental area. European Journal of Neuroscience, 26(11), 3141–3149. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2007.05934.x 
de Wit, S., & Dickinson, A. (2009). Associative theories of goal-directed behaviour: a case for animal 
– human translational models. Psychological Research, 73, 463–476. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-009-0230-6 
Delamater, A. R. (1996). Effects of several extinction treatments upon the integrity of Pavlovian 
stimulus-outcome associations. Animal Learning & Behavior, 24(4), 437–449. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03199015 
Delamater, A. R., Schneider, K., & Derman, R. C. (2017). Extinction of specific atimulus-outcome (S-O) 
associations in Pavlovian learning with an extended CS procedure. Journal of Experimental 
31 
 
Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition, 43(3), 243–261. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/xan0000138 
Delamater, A. R., & Westbrook, F. R. (2014). Psychological and neural mechanisms of experimental 
extinction: A selective review. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 108, 38–51. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2013.09.016 
Eder, A. B., & Dignath, D. (2016a). Asymmetrical effects of posttraining outcome revaluation on 
outcome-selective Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer of control in human adults. Learning and 
Motivation, 54, 12–21. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Eder, A. B., & Dignath, D. (2016b). Cue-elicited food seeking is eliminated with aversive outcomes 
following outcome devaluation. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69(3), 574–588. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1062527 
Elsner, B., & Hommel, B. (2001). Effect anticipation and action control. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(1), 229–240. 
https://doi.org/10.1037//0096-1523.27.1.229 
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 
Hardy, L., Mitchell, C. J., Seabrooke, T., & Hogarth, L. (2017). Drug cue reactivity involves hierarchical 
instrumental learning: Evidence from a biconditional Pavlovian to instrumental transfer task. 
Psychopharmacology, 234(13), 1977–1984. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-
017-4605-x 
Hogarth, L. (2012). Goal-directed and transfer-cue-elicited drug-seeking are dissociated by 
pharmacotherapy: Evidence for independent additive controllers. Journal of Experimental 
32 
 
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 38(3), 266–278. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028914 
Hogarth, L., & Chase, H. W. (2011). Parallel goal-directed and habitual control of human drug-
seeking: Implications for dependence vulnerability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Behavior Processes, 37(3), 261–276. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022913 
Hogarth, L., Dickinson, A., & Duka, T. (2010). The associative basis of cue-elicited drug taking in 
humans. Psychopharmacology, 208(3), 337–351. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-009-1735-9 
Hogarth, L., Dickinson, A., Wright, A., Kouvaraki, M., & Duka, T. (2007). The role of drug expectancy 
in the control of human drug seeking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes, 33(4), 484–496. https://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.33.4.484 
Hogarth, L., Retzler, C., Munafò, M. R., Tran, D. M. D., Troisi, J. R., Rose, A. K., … Field, M. (2014). 
Extinction of cue-evoked drug-seeking relies on degrading hierarchical instrumental 
expectancies. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 59, 61–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2014.06.001 
Hogarth, L., & Troisi, J. R. I. (2015). A hierarchical instrumental decision theory of nicotine 
dependence, 23, 165–191. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13665-3 
Holland, P. C. (1989). Feature extinction enhances transfer of occasion setting. Animal Learning & 
Behavior, 17(3), 269–279. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03209799 
Holland, P. C. (2004). Relations between Pavlovian-instrumental transfer and reinforcer devaluation. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 30(2), 104–117. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.30.2.104 
JASP Team. (2018). JASP (Version 0.8.5)[Computer software]. Retrieved from https://jasp-stats.org/ 
Kruse, J. M., Overmier, J. B., Konz, W. A., & Rokke, E. (1983). Pavlovian conditioned stimulus effects 




Le Pelley, M. E., Mitchell, C. J., Beesley, T., George, D. N., & Wills, A. J. (2016). Attention and 
associative learning: An integrative review. Psychological Bulletin, 142(10), 1111–1140. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000064 
Lovibond, P. F., Satkunarajah, M., & Colagiuri, B. (2015). Extinction can reduce the impact of reward 
cues on reward-seeking behavior. Behavior Therapy, 46(4), 432–438. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2015.03.005 
Mackintosh, N. J. (1975). A theory of attention: Variations in the associability of stimuli with 
reinforcement. Psychological Review, 82(4), 276–298. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076778 
Pavlov, I. P. (1932). The reply of a physiologist to psychologists. The Psychological Review, 39(2), 91–
297. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0069929 
Pritchard, T. L., Weidemann, G., & Hogarth, L. (2017). Negative emotional appraisal selectively 
disrupts retrieval of expected outcome values required for goal-directed instrumental choice. 
Cognition and Emotion. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2017.1359017 
Rescorla, R. A. (1991). Associative relations in instrumental learning: The eighteenth Bartlett 
memorial lecture. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section B, 43(1), 1–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14640749108401256 
Rescorla, R. A. (1994). Transfer of instrumental control mediated by a devalued outcome. Animal 
Learning & Behavior, 22(1), 27–33. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03199953 
Rescorla, R. A., & Solomon, R. L. (1967). Two-process learning theory: Relationships between 
Pavlovian conditioning and instrumental learning. Psychological Review, 74(3), 713–713. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0021465 
Ridley-Siegert, T. L., Crombag, H. S., & Yeomans, M. R. (2015). Whether or not to eat: A controlled 
34 
 
laboratory study of discriminative cueing effects on food intake in humans. Physiology and 
Behavior, 152, 347–353. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physbeh.2015.06.039 
Robbins, S. J. (1990). Mechanisms Underlying Spontaneous Recovery in Autoshaping. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 16(3), 235–249. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.16.3.235 
Rosas, J. M., Paredes-Olay, M. C., García-Gutiérrez, A., Espinosa, J. J., & Abad, M. J. F. (2010). 
Outcome-specific transfer between predictive and instrumental learning is unaffected by 
extinction but reversed by counterconditioning in human participants. Learning and 
Motivation, 41(1), 48–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lmot.2009.09.002 
Seabrooke, T., Hogarth, L., & Mitchell, C. J. (2016). The propositional basis of cue-controlled reward 
seeking. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69(12), 2452–2470. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1115885 
Seabrooke, T., Le Pelley, M. E., Hogarth, L., & Mitchell, C. J. (2017). Evidence of a goal-directed 
process in human Pavlovian-instrumental transfer. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Learning and Cognition, 43(4), 377–387. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xan0000147 
Trapold, M. A., & Overmier, J. B. (1972). The second learning process in instrumental learning. In 
Classical conditioning ii: Current research and theory (pp. 427–452). 
van Steenbergen, H., Watson, P., Wiers, R. W., Hommel, B., & de Wit, S. (2017). Dissociable 
corticostriatal circuits underlie goal-directed versus cue-elicited habitual food seeking after 
satiation: Evidence from a multimodal MRI study. European Journal of Neuroscience, 46(2), 
1815–1827. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejn.13586 
Watson, P., Wiers, R. W., Hommel, B., & de Wit, S. (2014). Working for food you don’t desire. Cues 




Watson, P., Wiers, R. W., Hommel, B., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & de Wit, S. (2016). An associative account 















 Transfer test 
Experiments 1 and 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
R1 – O1 
R2 – O2 
 A – O1 
B – O1 
C – O2 
D – O2 
E – O1 
F – O2 
 B – Ø 
D – Ø 
E – O1 
F – O2 
 A: R1 vs R2? 
B: R1 vs R2? 
C: R1 vs R2? 
D: R1 vs R2? 
AD: R1 vs R2? 
BC: R1 vs R2? 
Note: R1 and R2 represent instrumental responses (left and right arrow key presses), O1 to O2 
represent outcomes (crisps and popcorn points), and A to F represent Pavlovian stimuli (coloured 





Design of Experiment 3 
Instrumental 
training 







R1 – O1 
R2 – O2 
 A – O1 
A – O2 
A – O3 
B – O1 
B – O2 
B – O3 
C – O1 
C – O2 
C – No O3 
D – No O1 
D – No O2 
D – No O3 
 A – No O2 
A – O3 
B – No O1 
B – O3 
C – O1 
C – O2 
R1 – O1 
R2 – O2 
A: R1 vs R2? 
B: R1 vs R2? 
 
Note: R1 and R2 represent instrumental responses (left and right arrow key presses), O1 to O3 
represent outcomes (crisps, popcorn and cashew nuts points), and A to D represent Pavlovian stimuli 







Figure 1. Results of Experiment 1. A and C were non-extinguished stimuli that were paired with O1 
and O2, respectively, during Pavlovian acquisition. B and D were stimuli that were paired with O1 
and O2, respectively, during Pavlovian acquisition. Stimulus B and D were then extinguished. 
Stimulus E and F were control stimuli that were paired with O1 and O2, respectively, during both the 
Pavlovian acquisition and extinction phase. (a) Percentage of correct predictions to each of the six 
stimuli presented during the Pavlovian acquisition and extinction phases. (b) The percent choice of 
the R1 versus R2 response to each of the four stimuli presented during the transfer test. Scores 
above 50% represent a bias towards R1; scores below 50% reflect a bias towards R2. Error bars are 




Figure 2. Results of Experiment 2. A and C were non-extinguished stimuli that were paired with O1 
and O2, respectively, during Pavlovian acquisition. B and D were stimuli that were paired with O1 
and O2, respectively, during Pavlovian acquisition. Stimulus B and D were then extinguished. 
Stimulus E and F were control stimuli that were paired with O1 and O2, respectively, during both the 
Pavlovian acquisition and extinction phase.  (a) Percentage of correct predictions to each of the six 
stimuli presented during the Pavlovian training phase. (b) The percent choice of the R1 versus R2 
response to the two stimulus compounds that were presented during the transfer test. Scores above 
50% represent a bias towards R1; scores below 50% reflect a bias towards R2. Error bars are 




Figure 3. An example Pavlovian training trial. At the start of each trial (left), a grey box with a written 
outcome was superimposed on a coloured square, along with a question and response options. 





Figure 4. Results of Experiment 3. (a) Percentage of correct predictions to the critical cues on each 
block in the acquisition and extinction phases of Pavlovian training. (b) The percent choice of the R1 
versus R2 response to cues A and B during the transfer test. Scores above 50% represent a bias 
towards R1; scores below 50% reflect a bias towards R2. (c) Mean expectancies for outcomes O1 and 
O2 in the presence of cues A and B during the expectancy ratings. Ratings of 1 and 7 represent 
expecting the outcome “very much” and “not at all”, respectively. Error bars are difference-adjusted 
within-subject 95% confidence intervals (Baguley, 2012). 
